Tatia Chikhladze, University of Bremen
Executive summary
In September 2016, after Islam Karimov’s death – who had been ruling the country since it obtained independence in 1991 – Uzbekistan faced a challenging period for the transfer of power. Many questions have been raised at the time on whether key members of the political elite would agree on a single candidate for succession and how would events evolve after his selection. These developments were important for the international community as well, since they determined the new leadership of the country with whom international organizations and governments would have had relations with. As this policy paper shows, the selection of the successor took place peacefully among the elite, although by the time of obtaining the presidency, the new leader – Shavkat Mirziyoyev – was ruling the country along some other influential political figures. As later developments demonstrated, Mirziyev managed to consolidate his political power by gradually eliminating all alternative power centers by appointing his close associates to key political positions.
Introduction
This policy paper addresses the issue of power succession which took place in one of the Central Asian States, Uzbekistan, in 2016. Generally, power succession periods entail a high risk in the context of non-democratic regimes. Because in these countries elections play only a nominal role, everything is decided by the members of the inner political elite and there is a high probability that they will not be able to agree on a single candidate for succession, leading to inter-elite splits and defections. Another issue in this context is that since power is concentrated in the hands of authoritarian leaders, him/her leaving a political position for whatever reason, might lead to a significant power vacuum, potentially leading to regime instability. The political elite of Uzbekistan is not homogenous, it consists of several political groupings, often referred to as ‘clans.’ Country experts identify three to seven clans in Uzbekistan, including the Samarkand-Bukhara, Tashkent, Ferghana, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya-Kashkadarya, Khorezm, and Karakalpak clans.[1] Each of these clans has its own particular interest and in 2016 the risk was that each of them started promoting their own candidate for succession, leading to the instability and the weakening of the regime. This paper illustrates how power succession took place in Uzbekistan, the actions taken by the incoming leader and the key elite members, or, in other words, who to talk to in Uzbekistan after the transfer of power in 2016.
Power transfer from Islam Karimov to Shavkat Mirziyoyev
The main aim of this paper is to trace how power transfer was implemented in 2016 in Uzbekistan. What actions did the incoming leader take? Did he keep key elite members of Karimov’s administration or sidelined them to replace them with his own people?
Due to Karimov’s age, power succession was highly predictable in Uzbekistan. Three main candidates were believed to have potential to succeed him. One was Rustam Inoyatov, the head of the National Security Service and one of the most influential political figures in the country. Although Inayatov too was ahead with the age and therefore less likely to take the presidential post, his support to any future candidate was crucial for the power transfer. The other two likely contenders were Shavkat Mirziyoyev – the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan since 2003 – and Rustam Azimov – the First Deputy Prime Minister. Key elite members agreed on the candidacy of Mirziyoyev. Several factors contributed to his selection. First was Mirziyoyev’s loyalty to the deceased president, which reassured elite members that he would have guaranteed the elite interests and security. Second, Mirziyoyev was the protégé of one of the most influential figures in the country, Inoyatov, who controlled security services in Uzbekistan.[2] Another factor that played in Mirziyoyev’s favor was that he enjoyed links to the most influential power groups in the country, Jizzakh and Samarkand, and therefore possessed the broadest power-network among all potential contenders.[3]
After obtaining the presidency, a key question remained. Would the incoming leader be able to consolidate his power? When Mirziyoyev was elected, two main contenders and power players remained, Azimov and Inoyatov.
Mirziyoyev managed to consolidate his power by gradually neutralizing and sidelining Azimov and Inoyatov and their power. In 2016, Azimov was first removed from his post as Minister of Finance and, soon after, also from that of Deputy Prime Minister. In doing so, Mirziyoyev enjoyed the support of Inoyatov, against which the new president moved after having neutralized Azimov. Yet, because of Inoyatov’s extensive influence on the security services, the new President had to take several steps to gradually weaken his positions. Mirziyoyev managed to do so by gradually taking overseeing several key functions inside the National Security Service and dismissing some of Inayatov’s closest associates. Inoyatov was in fact eventually removed from his post of Head of National Security Service only in January 2018, after having served in this post for 23 years. With the dismissal of Azimov and Inoyatov, Mirzioyev was able to take full control of the political processes, gradually sidelining key figures of Karimov’s cabinet ministers as well. In 2018, only three of Karimov’s cabinet ministers kept their positions in Mirziyoyev’s cabinet. In their place, Mirziyoyev appointed ministers loyal to him, completing the building of his own power base.[4]
Key implications
As the paper shows, after coming to power in 2016, Mirziyoyev managed to consolidate his power in Uzbekistan by eroding the power of contenders and key political figures antecedent to his election. Some concluding remarks can be made:
- Despite speculations that power transfers in Uzbekistan might have led to inter-elite conflict and regime instability, the political elite peacefully managed to agree on the candidacy of a successor who was both well-connected to pre-existing power networks and was believed to pose no challenge to the positions of the political elite.
- The expectations of some elite members – according to which Mirziyoyev would rule the country alongside other power centers, such as those of Inoyatov and Azimov – turned out to be illusory. Soon after obtaining the presidency, Mirziyoyev began to consolidate his power sidelining the most influential and potentially challenging members of the existing elite, gradually and carefully, without applying any repressive measure. Alongside sidelining elite members and their closest associates, the incoming leader replaced them with his allies.
- Today Shavkat Mirziyoyev and his entourage enjoy complete control over the politics of Uzbekistan.
Sources consulted:
Alexey Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, Exploring Uzbekistan’s Potential Political Transition, July 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf
David Stern, Uzbekistan Confronts Succession with Ailing Karimov, Politico, 30 August 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/uzbekistan-holds-its-breath-over-an-ailing-karimov-leadership-shavkat-mirziyoyev/
Rico Isaaks, Charismatic Routinization and Problems of Post-Charisma Succession in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Studies of Transition States and Societies, 7(1), 2015, 58–76.
The Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://www.gov.uz/en/pages/government_sites
[1] Alexey Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, Exploring Uzbekistan’s Potential Political Transition, July 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf
[2]Rico Isaaks, Charismatic Routinization and Problems of Post-Charisma Succession in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Studies of Transition States and Societies, 7(1), 2015, p.72.
[3]David Stern, Uzbekistan Confronts Succession with Ailing Karimov, Politico, 30 August 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/uzbekistan-holds-its-breath-over-an-ailing-karimov-leadership-shavkat-mirziyoyev/
[4] The Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://www.gov.uz/en/pages/government_sites